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COMMENT
COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AS PUNITIVE
SENTENCES AND THE MINNESOTA
JUDICIARY’S EXPUNGEMENT AUTHORITY
ERIN WESTBROOK*
INTRODUCTION
In 1978, Minnesota became the first state to enact legally binding sen-
tencing guidelines to reduce disparities in sentencing and promote uniform-
ity and proportionality in criminal sentencing.1 Other states and the federal
government followed suit, and sentencing guidelines are now the norm.
While imperfect, sentencing guidelines were meant to address the wide dis-
parities and unbridled discretion in criminal sentencing. Today, the criminal
justice system faces a new challenge: managing the consequences of crimi-
nal conviction beyond those imposed through criminal sentencing. This
Comment urges Minnesota to continue to lead the way in criminal punish-
ment reform in light of the excessive and catastrophic effects of these so-
called collateral consequences or sanctions2 flowing from a criminal
conviction.
When an individual commits a crime, a judge imposes a criminal sen-
tence based upon the sentencing guidelines, which allow for consideration
of a variety of factors, including criminal history and the nature of the of-
fense. The sentencing guidelines provide safeguards to ensure that a sen-
tence is justified and follows traditionally recognized theories and goals of
punishment. Yet, once an offender has fulfilled her sentence, she faces reen-
try into society under the shadow of a criminal record that, among other
restrictions, prevents her from securing adequate employment and housing.
* Erin Westbrook is a lawyer in the Twin Cities area. Erin graduated from the University of
St. Thomas School of Law in 2012, where she was an editor for the University of St. Thomas Law
Journal. She received her undergraduate degree in Accountancy and Spanish from the University
of Notre Dame. Erin wishes to thank Professor Nekima Levy-Pounds for her comments and in-
sight on this comment.
1. Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, 1978–2003, 32 CRIME & JUST.
131, 131–132 (2005).
2. Although scholars have used many different terms when identifying the concept of collat-
eral consequences, this paper will generally use the term “collateral sanctions.”
959
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And whereas the offender’s judicially imposed sentence is subject to judi-
cial discretion within the limits of sentencing guidelines, the collateral “sen-
tence” is not subject to the same safeguards.
Instead, collateral sanctions are categorically imposed either through
state and federal legislation or through individual prejudice. Collateral sanc-
tions imposed through legislation include, for example, disenfranchisement,
denial of public benefits, or exclusion from certain government jobs. These
are codified restrictions on the ex-offender’s membership in society. On the
other hand, the collateral sanctions imposed through individual prejudice
are murkier and depend on the unpredictable (and potentially unprincipled)
whims of private individuals. For example, a private landlord might deny an
ex-offender’s housing application based solely on the existence of a crimi-
nal record. Similarly, an employer might reject an otherwise qualified ex-
offender. Although there are undeniably some cases where the exclusion of
an ex-offender is appropriate, there are also cases where an ex-offender
deserves a second chance—a chance that starts with the ability to obtain
adequate housing and employment. When private individuals preclude an
ex-offender from receiving that chance, they affect the ex-offender’s ability
to reintegrate into society.
To minimize the harm of collateral sanctions, courts should take reme-
dial measures such as granting expungements of criminal records with
greater regularity, especially in circumstances involving low-level, non-vio-
lent offenses. Under Minnesota law, the remedy of expungement “is limited
to a court order sealing the records and prohibiting the disclosure of their
existence or their opening except under court order or statutory authority.”3
Because the record is sealed, an expungement permits a person to state on a
background check that he has no criminal history.4 Expungements thus help
an ex-offender obtain housing and employment because landlords and em-
ployers are no longer able to access the ex-offender’s records. Because an
expungement provides relief from some of the devastating consequences of
a criminal conviction, in certain cases judges should have the authority to
expunge records, taking into consideration guidelines similar to those used
for criminal sentencing. In the past, judges in Minnesota have used their
inherent judicial authority to expunge records, but recent case law has se-
verely limited a judge’s ability to grant effective relief through
expungement.
This Comment advocates for the legislature to take steps to give the
judiciary discretionary authority to grant expungements based on the puni-
tive nature of collateral sanctions levied because of a person’s criminal re-
cord. Criminal records carry a social stigma that is often the root of
collateral sanctions related to housing and employment. Expungement ad-
3. MINN. STAT. § 609A.01 (2012).
4. State v. M.B.M., 518 N.W.2d 880, 882 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
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dresses these sanctions by preventing private citizens from accessing those
records. Part I of this paper provides an overview of both direct and collat-
eral sanctions flowing from a criminal conviction as well as the underlying
justifications for each. Part II compares the rationale behind the two types
of sanctions, noting the highly punitive nature of collateral sanctions that
are cloaked in civil statutes and imposed through private individuals and
institutions. Part III discusses the state of expungement law in Minnesota
and the case law that has limited judicial authority to grant expungement.
Finally, Part IV argues that based on the punitive nature of collateral sanc-
tions, Minnesota should reinvigorate judicial discretion so that expunge-
ment is a conceivable remedy for reducing the devastating effects of
collateral sanctions.
I. CONSEQUENCES OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION
A. Criminal Sanctions
1. Justifications for Punishment
Criminal law scholars generally agree that punishment for criminal be-
havior is theoretically justified as either a retributive or utilitarian measure.5
These justifications are often at odds with each other and focus on different
aspects of individual morality and public policy.6 As a practical matter,
state legislatures often articulate the justification (or justifications) for crim-
inal sentencing. The stated purpose impacts many aspects of the administra-
tion of criminal law because “[w]hether utilitarian or retributive purposes
apply pushes sentences toward one end or the other of the available sen-
tencing range, and toward imprisonment or toward alternatives.”7
Retributive theory is based on the idea of what an offender deserves
and “supposes that crime inherently merits punishment.”8 It is often associ-
ated with philosopher Immanuel Kant who “provided two guiding stan-
dards: his renowned principle of respect for persons and his insistence that
only the ‘Law of retribution’ (jus talionis) could determine the morally ap-
propriate kind and degree of punishment.”9 Three principles underlie the
theory of retribution:
(i) Punishment is justified only if it is deserved.
(ii) It is deserved if and only if the person punished has volunta-
rily done a wrong (and, specifically, the wrong being punished).
5. Michele Cotton, Back With a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated
Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1313 (2000). This is not to say that
scholars agree on which theories should exist or should justify punishment, but rather that these
theories are recognized as potential justifications for criminal punishment.
6. See id. at 1317.
7. Id. at 1318.
8. Id. at 1315.
9. M. Margaret Falls, Retribution, Reciprocity, and Respect for Persons, in PUNISHMENT 27,
27 (Antony Duff ed., 1993).
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(iii) The severity of punishment deserved is that which is propor-
tionate to the severity of the wrongdoing.10
The main distinction from the utilitarian theory is that retribution imposes
punishment based on merit or “just deserts” rather than based on perceived
social benefits.11 It considers “punishment as ends rather than means.”12
In contrast, utilitarian theory justifies punishment as the means to
achieve social benefits.13 The theory is generally further broken down into
justifications of deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.14 Using pun-
ishment as deterrence, society imposes consequences on those who breach
the social contract to dissuade others from doing the same.15 Incapacitation
refers to a punishment that includes some term of incarceration so as “to
remove the offender from society to protect it from the danger he poses.”16
Finally, rehabilitation “calls for the improvement of the criminal for his
own benefit and to reduce the probability that he will offend again.”17
The Minnesota legislature has adopted a utilitarian theory of punish-
ment in the state’s criminal code.18 The criminal code’s stated purpose is
“to protect the public safety and welfare by preventing the commission of
crime through the deterring effect of the sentences authorized, the rehabili-
tation of those convicted, and their confinement when the public safety and
interest requires . . . .”19 Although the legislature expressed these utilitarian
purposes, the Minnesota Supreme Court has also reinforced retribution as a
justification for punishment.20 Thus, there is a general acceptance and rec-
ognition of both theories of punishment, despite the potentially conflicting
aspects of each.
2. Principles of Sentencing
Distinct from, yet related to the theories of punishment, are principles
that effectuate the governing body’s elected theories and also safeguard the
10. Id.
11. Cotton, supra note 5, at 1315–16.
12. Id. at 1315.
13. Id. at 1316.
14. Id.
15. See id. The term deterrence can also be divided into “specific deterrence,” which concen-
trates on dissuading the offender himself from committing future crimes, and “general deter-
rence,” which focuses on dissuading others. Id. In using the term deterrence, this paper will
generally refer to “general deterrence.”
16. Cotton, supra note 5, at 1316.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1326.
19. MINN. STAT. § 609.01 subd. 1 (2012).
20. Cotton, supra note 5, at 1326 (citing State ex rel. Taylor v. Schoen, 273 N.W.2d 612, 616
(Minn. 1978)). In her article, Back With a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articu-
lated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, supra note 5, at 1326, Michele Cotton claims  that “[b]y
making retribution a consideration where the statute had omitted it, thereby effectively reducing
and counterbalancing the role played by rehabilitation, the [Minnesota Supreme Court] blatantly
contravened state law.”
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offender’s rights. For example, in addition to the utilitarian purposes of
punishment, Minnesota’s criminal code is also meant “to protect the indi-
vidual against the misuse of the criminal law . . . .”21 It does so by: (1)
“fairly defining the acts and omissions prohibited”, (2) “authorizing
sentences reasonably related to the conduct and character of the convicted
person”, and (3) “prescribing fair and reasonable postconviction proce-
dures.”22 These safeguards suggest three overarching principles: predict-
ability, proportionality, and equity. Although these principles protect the
individual, they also promote theories of punishment. For example, to im-
pose a criminal sentence for deterrence, the sentence must be predictable—
a potential offender cannot be deterred from doing an act when he is not
aware it is a crime or by a consequence when he is not aware it will occur.
By “fairly defining the acts and omissions prohibited,” the legislature ad-
vances deterrence by ensuring that society is aware of the acts that consti-
tute a crime and can then avoid engaging in those acts. Likewise, by
sentencing in a way that is related to the conduct and character of a person,
the legislature requires proportionality and thereby honors the theories of
retribution and incapacitation.23
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission (the “MSGC”) has
also advanced these theories of punishment by promoting predictability,
proportionality, and equity in sentencing. The MSGC has determined that
the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines are intended to “establish rational and
consistent sentencing standards which reduce sentencing disparity and en-
sure that sanctions following conviction of a felony are proportional to the
severity of the offense of conviction and the extent of the offender’s crimi-
nal history.”24 Here again, the state promotes deterrence because punish-
ment cannot deter future offenses if it is not imposed “rational[ly] and
consistent[ly]”; one is not deterred by punishment if one has no clear sense
of what that punishment will be. The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines pro-
mote proportionality as an explicit objective. The Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines thus seek to accomplish generally recognized theories of punish-
ment by imposing direct sanctions wherein the severity of the offense pri-
marily determines the severity of the punishment.25 Collateral sanctions on
the other hand, often fail to accomplish these goals and may even serve to
counteract theories of punishment.
21. MINN. STAT. § 609.01 subd. 1 (2012).
22. Id.
23. See infra Part II.
24. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY § 1 (2011) [hereinafter MINNE-
SOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES].
25. See id. § 2.B.01 cmt. at 5.
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B. Collateral Sanctions
After an offender has served his sentence, he often assumes—mistak-
enly—that he has paid his debt and is free to undertake any lawful pursuit
of his choosing.26 Not so. Instead, he faces a myriad of obstacles to success-
ful reintegration. Among the most significant barriers are those related to
finding employment and housing, receiving public benefits, and participat-
ing in civic activities.27 These barriers are collectively known as collateral
sanctions. While collateral sanctions have existed in the statutory scheme
for many years, as illustrated below, scholars have recently started criticiz-
ing their expanding presence.
1. Defining Collateral Consequences
a. Civil Penalties
Collateral sanctions have been identified, defined, renamed, and rede-
fined by legal scholars, sociologists, and legislatures over the years.28
Though collateral sanctions or collateral consequences may be the more
common terms, some scholars argue that “collateral civil penalties” may be
the most appropriate:
We use the term collateral civil penalties to characterize a host of
legal restrictions that have come to hinder . . . the life chances for
a large number of disadvantaged individuals, their families, and
communities in the poorest sections of U.S. cities. The term itself
is both awkward and imprecise, as the “civil” and “collateral” na-
ture of the penalties is contested by many, including ourselves.
Nevertheless we use the term (1) because it is more accurate than
other terms, such as civil disabilities or collateral consequences,
that fail to adequately emphasize the punitive nature of the sanc-
26. See Margaret Colgate Love, The Debt That Can Never Be Paid: A Report Card on the
Collateral Consequences of Conviction, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2006, at 16, 17; Christopher Mele &
Teresa A. Miller, Collateral Civil Penalties as Techniques of Social Policy, in CIVIL PENALTIES,
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 9, 12 (Christopher Mele & Teresa A. Miller eds., 2005) [hereinafter Mele
& Miller, Techniques of Social Policy].
27. Christopher Mele & Teresa A. Miller, Introduction, in CIVIL PENALTIES, SOCIAL CONSE-
QUENCES, supra note 26, at 1, 1 [hereinafter Mele & Miller, Introduction].
28. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609B.050 subd. 1(2) (2012) (“‘[C]ollateral sanction’ means a
legal penalty, disability, or disadvantage, however denominated, that is imposed on a person auto-
matically when that person is convicted of or found to have committed a crime, even if the sanc-
tion is not included in the sentence.”); Gabriel J. Chin, Race, The War on Drugs, and the
Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253, 255 (2002)
(“Collateral consequences can be defined as penalties, disabilities, or disadvantages that occur
automatically because of a criminal conviction, other than the sentence itself.”); Nora V.
Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Conse-
quences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 154 (1999) [hereinafter Demleitner, Preventing Internal
Exile] (“[C]ollateral sentencing consequences encompass all civil restrictions that flow from a
criminal conviction.”).
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tions and (2) because it makes the irony inherent in the term that
much more prominent.29
Regardless of the term used, it is generally agreed that collateral sanctions
are civil ramifications that flow automatically, yet indirectly, from a convic-
tion and severely restrict an ex-offender’s ability to fully reenter society
after completing a criminal sentence.
An ex-offender may encounter collateral sanctions due to both formal
prohibitions created by statute and informal social rejection imposed by pri-
vate citizens.30 For example, Minnesota statutes impose around two hun-
dred civil “collateral sanctions”31 relating to license revocation, prohibitions
from employment, restrictions on civil rights, and many others.32
In addition to statutory sanctions, ex-offenders may face informal
sanctions because of the stigma attached to their criminal records. These
sanctions emerge in the form of prejudice, social rejection, and exclusion
from employment and housing, among others. In the employment context,
surveys have shown that sixty to seventy percent of employers would de-
cline to hire an ex-offender.33 Moreover, with few exceptions, this reluc-
tance to hire ex-offenders often exists regardless of the underlying
offense.34 Employers do not consider the offense’s relevance to the per-
formance of a particular job but rather “view a criminal history as a sign of
poor work habits and an indicator of lack of honesty and trustworthiness
. . . .”
35
 Even in cases where employers have outwardly expressed a willing-
ness to hire ex-offenders, studies have shown that in practice, many of these
employers still tend to reject ex-offenders.36
Dr. Devah Pager has described a criminal record as a “negative creden-
tial,” defined as “those official markers that restrict access and opportunity
rather than enabling them.”37 As Dr. Pager explains, this is comparable but
palpably distinct from a “positive credential.” “In parallel (but inverse)
fashion to the positive credentials of a college degree or professional mem-
bership, the criminal credential conveys generalized information to employ-
29. Mele & Miller, Introduction, supra note 27, at 1, 1.
30. See DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS
INCARCERATION 34 (2007).
31. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 6
(2007), available at http://archive.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2007/mandated/070025.pdf; see also
MINN. STAT. §§ 609B.050–.725 (2012) (cross-referencing to Minnesota statutes that impose col-
lateral consequences).
32. See MINN. STAT. §§ 609B.050–.725.
33. PAGER, supra note 30, at 34.
34. Id. at 5.
35. Id. at 34 (quoting Lonnie Freeman Husley, Attitudes of Employers with Respect to Hir-
ing Released Prisoners (unpublished dissertation, Texas A&M University, 1990) (on file with
University Microfilms International), at 50).
36. PAGER, supra note 30, at 34.
37. Id. at 32.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\9-3\UST312.txt unknown Seq: 8  7-MAY-13 14:32
966 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:3
ers about the skills and disposition of presenting job applicants.”38 In other
words, as much as a Harvard degree tends to propel a resume to the top of
the pile, a conviction tends to thrust it to the bottom, or—a more likely
scenario—to the trash.
b. Invisibility
In addition to being a civil penalty, collateral sanctions carry the dis-
tinct feature of invisibility. They have been described as “invisible punish-
ment,”39 named because their impact may be unknown and undisclosed to a
criminal defendant before or at the time of conviction.40 Because collateral
sanctions technically sit outside the criminal justice system, those involved
in the criminal process generally do not consider them throughout sentenc-
ing or plea bargaining stages.41 Moreover, given the complex statutory
scheme that often buries collateral sanctions throughout the civil code,
many argue that it would be difficult to require counsel to inform a client of
every sanction that the client might face in the future.42
Another reason collateral sanctions are deemed invisible is that they
arise out of civil, rather than criminal, legislation.43 Whereas legislation re-
lated to criminal sentencing is often “high-profile,” civil legislation impos-
ing collateral sanctions is often overlooked.44 Collateral sanctions “tend to
be enacted with limited public knowledge and virtually no public debate,
thus enhancing their ‘invisibility.’”45
2. Impact of Collateral Sanctions
These often invisible collateral sanctions have expanded over the last
decade—an expansion that many have criticized as unfair and excessive.
This expansion carries many injustices, but this Comment will discuss two
in particular. First, collateral sanctions effectuate a cycle of poverty and
increase the likelihood of recidivism, foisting perpetual punishment on an
ex-offender. Second, collateral sanctions disproportionately punish minori-
38. Id. at 34.
39. See generally INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IM-
PRISONMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002); see also Michael Pinard, Reflec-
tions and Perspectives on Reentry and Collateral Consequences, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1213, 1215 (2010) [hereinafter Pinard, Reflections and Perspectives] (citing Travis, supra); Chin,
supra note 28, at 253 (referring to collateral sanctions as a “ton of bricks” that is “invisible”).
40. Pinard, Reflections and Perspectives, supra note 39, at 1215–16.
41. Id. at 1215. But see Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (holding that
although deportation is not a criminal sanction, “counsel must inform her client whether his plea
carries a risk of deportation”).
42. Chin, supra note 28, at 253–54.
43. Mele & Miller, Techniques of Social Policy, supra note 26, at 9, 12.
44. Id. (citing “mandatory minimum sentences, ‘three strikes’ laws, and federal sentencing
guidelines” as highly visible areas of criminal sentencing legislation open to public debate and
critique).
45. Id.
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ties. Because of these injustices, it is important that those involved with
creating and imposing collateral sanctions maintain a dialogue about how
the legitimate purposes of collateral sanctions can be appropriately adminis-
tered while ensuring fairness to the ex-offender.
a. Poverty and Recidivism
Collateral sanctions contribute to increased rates of poverty and recidi-
vism, largely due to the formal and informal restraints on an ex-offender’s
ability to obtain stable employment and housing.46 Employment plays a key
role in minimizing recidivism, “with the intuition that steady work can re-
duce the incentives of crime.”47 And this is a logical result; when an ex-
offender’s criminal record excludes her from gainful employment, she is
left with few choices. When the offender is from a poor community with
higher rates of poverty and crime, she may be tempted to earn money
through illicit means when faced with unemployment. Crime may seem like
her only choice.48
Not only do barriers to employment and housing make it practically
difficult to earn a living while obeying the law, but these barriers can also
have a devastating emotional impact. Employment and housing are basic
needs that are essential to successful reintegration into society after convic-
tion. But when an ex-offender’s criminal record bars her from fulfilling
these needs, the barriers relegate her to a second-class citizen—a status
which many argue increases the likelihood that she will offend again.49 Yet
as discussed below, collateral sanctions are largely justified as public safety
measures. In light of this paradox, collateral sanctions should only be im-
posed in a way that balances these factors.
b. Disparate Impact
Most scholars agree that collateral consequences disproportionately
and unfairly affect communities of color.50 Although the disparate impact
of collateral consequences may be due in part to the disproportionate con-
viction rates of people of color, some have argued that the civil sanctions
themselves are directed towards communities of color. Professor Michael
Pinard has argued that the growing disparate impact of collateral sanctions
is the result of negligent and/or intentional policy decisions that are influ-
enced by race.
46. See Love, supra note 26, at 17–18.
47. PAGER, supra note 30, at 25.
48. See Elizabeth Curtin, Home Sweet Home for Ex-Offenders, in CIVIL PENALTIES, SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES, supra note 26, at 111, 112.
49. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile, supra note 28, at 160; R. Paul Davis, The Mark of
Cain: Some Subliminal Effects of Criminal Process, 44 SASK. L. REV. 219, 219–20 (1980).
50. See, e.g., Pinard, Reflections and Perspectives, supra note 39, at 1215.
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Under Pinard’s negligence theory, the disparate impact may merely be
an unavoidable corollary of the disproportionate over-representation of peo-
ple of color in the criminal justice system and the legislature’s failure to
consider this disparity when imposing new collateral consequences.51 One
example of this is the “War on Drugs” that began in the 1980s. In an effort
to fight the “War on Drugs,” Congress enacted new laws that would make it
more difficult for those convicted of certain drug offenses to take advantage
of some federal aid programs.52 Sentencing laws for drug offenses also be-
came harsher.53 But when enacting these new laws, Congress “ignored both
the racial history of drug criminalization and the predictably disproportion-
ate impact that these consequences would have on people of color.”54 Thus,
even though Congress could have foreseen the disparate impact from the
expansion of collateral consequences during the “War on Drugs,” Congress
neglected to consider the impact or enact measures that might alleviate it.
The more sinister view blames the disparate impact of collateral sanc-
tions on an intentional policy decision to ensure that communities of color
suffer the effects of collateral sanctions more than others.55 While felon
disenfranchisement is not the focus of this paper, given its “long historical
pattern of racial exclusion,” it provides a useful illustration of the racial
implications of collateral sanctions.56 Although criminal disenfranchise-
ment laws had existed since colonial times in America, “[a]fter Reconstruc-
tion, disenfranchisement laws were retooled specifically to exclude African
Americans from voting.”57 For example, some states drafted their disen-
franchisement laws to target crimes that the legislatures deemed to be pri-
marily committed by African Americans while excluding those alleged to
be primarily committed by whites. Although such overt racism has subsided
since the days of Jim Crow, the impact of disenfranchisement laws contin-
ues to exclude African Americans from voting at a greater rate than
others.58 In light of this history, collateral sanctions can be viewed as an
extension of covertly repressive statutory schemes.
In addition to directly repressive statutes such as felon disenfranchise-
ment laws, collateral consequences also “involve[ ] institutions unrelated to
51. See id. (“[J]ust as mass incarceration has disproportionately impacted individuals and
communities of color in urban centers in the United States, mass reentry is now doing the same.”)
52. Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of
Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 513 (2010) [hereinafter Pinard, Confronting Issues of
Race and Dignity].
53. Id. at 514–16 (discussing harsher penalties for drug offenses and studies showing how
“sentencing laws—such as the federal sentencing policy which imposes more severe punishment
for possession of crack than for powder cocaine—and school zone drug laws have had a dispro-
portionate impact on African Americans.”).
54. Id. at 514.
55. Id. at 512–13.
56. Id. at 512.
57. Id. at 512–13.
58. Pinard, Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, supra note 52, at 512–13.
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criminal justice in the management and social control of targeted popula-
tions.”59 This invites further discrimination as studies have shown the exac-
erbated impact that criminal records have on people of color compared to
others with a criminal record.60 This means that not only are there policies
and laws in place that permit the government to exclude individuals from
certain jobs and public housing, but the government also facilitates private
citizens to do the same. “All become complicit in the denial of eligibility of
persons (and, by extension, their families if the head of a household) based
on criminal records.”61
3. Historical Justifications for Collateral Sanctions
Despite the harsh impact of collateral sanctions on ex-offenders, soci-
ety historically justified them because they are loosely in accordance with
some of the above-mentioned retributive and utilitarian justifications for
criminal punishment. Some have argued that collateral sanctions serve re-
tributive and deterrent purposes;62 however, there is general agreement that
the primary purpose is to incapacitate an ex-offender, preventing him from
committing future crimes.63 Thus, collateral sanctions are considered public
safety measures. Although some of the purported justifications for criminal
and collateral sanctions are similar, “[t]here is widespread agreement that
collateral sentencing consequences do not serve a rehabilitative function
and may even actively thwart attempts at rehabilitation by preventing the
ex-offender’s reintegration into society.”64
As a retributive measure, collateral sanctions have been deemed appro-
priately punitive—an offender “deserves” any restraint on his freedom to
obtain adequate employment and housing because of his own “breach of the
social contract.”65 In the past, because of their retributive nature, collateral
sanctions were imposed largely in proportion to the severity of the
offense.66
Some argue that collateral sanctions act as deterrents by dissuading
individuals from committing crimes in order to avoid the hardships they
might face after completing a criminal sentence.67 In citing deterrence as a
legitimate justification for imposing collateral consequences, “[t]he idea . . .
is that deterrence could be a plausible goal even when the nexus between
59. Mele & Miller, Techniques of Social Policy, supra note 26, at 9, 21.
60. See PAGER, supra note 30, at 90–92.
61. Mele & Miller, Techniques of Social Policy, supra note 26, at 9, 21.
62. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile, supra note 28, at 160.
63. See id.; Mele & Miller, Techniques of Social Policy, supra note 26, at 9, 10.
64. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile, supra note 28, at 160.
65. Mele & Miller, Techniques of Social Policy, supra note 26, at 9–10.
66. Id. at 9.
67. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile, supra note 28, at 161.
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the criminal act and the collateral penalty is tenuous or nonexistent.”68 For
example, in the context of public housing:
[D]enying public housing to an individual convicted of any mis-
demeanor (or, in some jurisdictions, even a noncriminal violation)
may not be the result of any assumption that the particular indi-
vidual would pose a danger to his or her neighbors. Rather, the
penalty serves to deter individuals living in public housing and
prospective public housing tenants from engaging in criminal
activity.69
  As an incapacitative or preventive measure, collateral sanctions have been
recognized as an important public safety measure to protect citizens from
the “possibility of ex-felons further breaching laws.”70 Similarly, some ar-
gue that this prevention is also intended to protect society from the “cor-
rupting influence” of an ex-offender.71 This theory is largely based on the
argument that certain ex-offenders are more likely to reoffend.72 Because
collateral sanctions were initially intended to prevent future crimes by ex-
offenders, in the past, the incapacitative sanctions were generally closely
tied with the underlying offense.73 For example, an individual’s profes-
sional license might be revoked if that individual engaged in criminal activ-
ity associated with his profession.74 Legislatures tend to continue to justify
collateral consequences on public safety grounds rather than retributive or
deterrent grounds and, in doing so, circumvent consideration of the theoreti-
cal justifications that might otherwise be invoked when imposing
punishment.75
But despite what any legislature claims is the nature of collateral sanc-
tions, these sanctions undeniably serve to punish. That they might also
serve public safety interests should not justify the breadth with which they
are imposed. And given their punitive nature coupled with their inadequate
justifications, the imposition of collateral sanctions merits further consider-
ation by the legislature.
68. Pinard, Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, supra note 52, at 508.
69. Id.
70. Mele & Miller, Techniques of Social Policy, supra note 26, at 9, 10.
71. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile, supra note 28, at 161.
72. Id.
73. Mele & Miller, Techniques of Social Policy, supra note 26, at 9, 10.
74. Id. But see Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile, supra note 28, at 156 (explaining that
professional boards need not link the underlying offense to the profession in order to justify dis-
qualifying an individual from professional licensure based on the necessity to “foster high profes-
sional standards”).
75. Nora V. Demleitner, A Vicious Cycle: Resanctioning Offenders, in CIVIL PENALTIES, SO-
CIAL CONSEQUENCES, supra note 26, at 185, 186 [hereinafter Demleitner, Vicious Cycle].
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II. COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AS PUNITIVE SENTENCES
Although collateral sanctions are understood within the framework of
civil law, this understanding misses the punitive nature of collateral sanc-
tions. Not only do offenders face the direct, tangible punishment imposed
by criminal sentences, but they also face the indirect, invisible punishment
of collateral sanctions. While collateral sanctions and criminal sentences are
both ostensibly justified on retributive and utilitarian theories of punish-
ment, in imposing collateral sanctions, legislatures utterly fail to accomplish
the policies of predictability, proportionality, and equity that are vital to
effectuating these theories.
First, from a retributive standpoint, collateral sanctions run contrary to
the concept of proportionality, “which is a hallmark of retributive sentenc-
ing.”76 Instead, they perpetually punish an ex-offender so he can never re-
pay his “debt” to society; the punishment is excessive, continues beyond the
criminal sentence, and results in a punishment that is greater than the of-
fender’s “just deserts.” Proportionality is at best impracticable and at worst
impossible given the breadth of the laws inflicting collateral sanctions along
with the stigma attached to any criminal record, regardless of the offense.
These consequences result in a punishment not imposed and not considered
by the criminal justice system in sentencing.77 Thus, any collateral sanction
is inherently disproportionate, particularly from a retributive standpoint, to
the offense because the criminal justice system has already imposed a sen-
tence that the legislature has deemed as adequate and proportionate.78
Moreover, grounding collateral sanctions in retributive theory directly
conflicts with Kant’s conception of retribution as based in respect for the
person and individualization—a principle that is unique to the theory of
retribution and distinguishes it from utilitarian principles that seek to pro-
mote societal benefits. Instead, collateral sanctions corral individuals into
groups and deny privileges and rights based on group status, rather than
individual conduct and character. By definition, this process of de-individu-
alization results in punishment that lacks proportionality, falling away from
the traditional theory of retribution. Yet, despite the fact that they are not
entirely consistent with the theory of retribution, collateral sanctions unde-
niably impose punishment. They simply lack the adequate justification and
corresponding necessary safeguards.
Basing collateral sanctions on deterrence also fails. “A basic precept of
general deterrence theory is that individuals, to be deterred by a penalty,
must be aware of its existence.”79 But collateral sanctions are often invisi-
76. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile, supra note 28, at 160.
77. Id.
78. See id. (“Many offenders experience collateral consequences as additional and dispropor-
tionate punishment that runs counter to the adage that after the sentence is served, the offender has
paid his or her debt to society.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
79. Pinard, Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, supra note 52, at 508.
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ble, hindering this awareness and precluding the predictability that is a cor-
nerstone of deterrence as a justification for criminal punishment. It is
impossible to deter a potential offender through collateral sanctions when
the individual has no knowledge of these sanctions or when the sanctions
are imposed in a “haphazard way” such that the likelihood of their enforce-
ment is uncertain.80 The concept of deterrence presupposes knowledge of
the consequences of one’s actions before one acts. Because collateral conse-
quences are largely invisible, they are ineffective means of achieving
deterrence.
The best argument in favor of collateral sanctions is founded in public
safety considerations—collateral sanctions serve an incapacitative function
to prevent ex-offenders from reoffending by removing them from situations
where they might do so. But because legislatures have cast such a wide and
indiscriminate net in defining and imposing collateral sanctions, public
safety no longer justifies their broad use. Indeed, the purportedly preventive
restrictions on an ex-offender’s ability to attain housing and employment
arguably has a harmful effect on public safety, given the susceptibility to
poverty and recidivism when an ex-offender lacks these basic needs. Soci-
ety can only truly legitimize restrictions on housing and employment when
the restrictions are closely tied to the underlying offense. “An obvious ex-
ample can be found in the employment context, when individuals convicted
of child sex offenses are barred from working with children.”81 But instead
of imposing only targeted restrictions, legislatures impose broad ones that
include all offenders within certain categories. Thus, “[e]ven though they
may be designed to prevent further unlawful activity, they restrict much
lawful activity.”82 This defies notions of predictability, proportionality, and
equity and is an unacceptable infringement on civil liberties.
III. EXPUNGEMENT
One way to reduce the impact of collateral sanctions is to expunge an
ex-offender’s criminal record. An expungement limits the statutory and so-
cial consequences barring the individual from employment and housing.
The term “expunge” literally means “to erase or destroy.”83 In Minnesota,
however, the statutory remedy of expungement is “limited to a court order
sealing the records and prohibiting the disclosure of their existence or their
opening except under court order or statutory authority.”84 In any case, ex-
pungement is intended to “erase all evidence of the event as if it never
80. See Demleitner, Vicious Cycle, supra note 75, at 185, 198.
81. Pinard, Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, supra note 52, at 508.
82. Demleitner, Vicious Cycle, supra note 75, at 185, 198 (providing as an example the case
where conviction of a nonviolent offense may prevent an ex-offender from working in a lawful
job that would require him to carry a firearm or from enjoying lawful activities such as hunting).
83. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 662 (9th ed. 2009).
84. MINN. STAT. § 609A.01 (2012).
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occurred,” and a person who has had a record expunged is permitted to
answer that he has no criminal history in response to background checks.85
Individuals with criminal records in Minnesota may seek expungement
under either statutory authority or inherent judicial authority. Chapter 609A
of the Minnesota statutes supplies the statutory grounds for which an of-
fender can seek to have his record expunged, yet the grounds are limited
and inapplicable to most cases. A judge’s inherent authority, on the other
hand, is a remedy that in the past has offered a much broader basis for
relief. But recent case law has severely limited the availability of expunge-
ment under inherent judicial authority, and it remains to be seen whether the
doctrine will provide meaningful relief in the future. Both statutory author-
ity and inherent authority are important avenues for those seeking expunge-
ment, and both should be reformed to better protect the interests of those
seeking to use them.
A. Statutory Authority – Minnesota Statute 609A
In Minnesota, an individual may petition to have certain records statu-
torily expunged under only three circumstances: (1) “[u]pon the dismissal
and discharge of proceedings against a person” for “[c]ertain controlled
substance offenses”, (2) when juveniles prosecuted as adults have been dis-
charged by the commissioner of corrections or successfully fulfilled the
conditions of their probation, and (3) when “all pending actions or proceed-
ings were resolved in favor of the petitioner.”86 Minnesota interprets the
third ground for relief, a resolution “in favor of the petitioner,” to apply to:
(1) arrest records when the petitioner was never formally charged, (2) a
disposition of not guilty, and (3) dismissals in cases prior to a determination
of guilt.87 None of the statutory grounds provides relief for an adult con-
victed of a crime other than relatively insignificant drug charges.88 Thus, no
matter how old a criminal record may be or how much an individual may
have rehabilitated, for many ex-offenders, the Minnesota legislature extends
no relief.
In enacting chapter 609A, the legislature intended to “create uniform
procedures for hearing and granting criminal expungements.”89 Yet, the
legislature also wanted to ensure that criminal records remained publicly
available in accordance with the presumption of public data promulgated in
85. State v. M.B.M., 518 N.W.2d 880, 882 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
86. MINN. STAT. § 609A.02 subds. 1–3 (2006).
87. Jon Geffen & Stefanie Letze, Chained to the Past: An Overview of Criminal Expunge-
ment Law in Minnesota—State v. Schultz, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1331, 1350 (2005).
88. Subdivision 1 refers to charges “under section 152.18, subdivision 1, for violation of
section 152.024, 152.025, or 152.027 for possession of a controlled substance” which allows the
court to discharge and dismiss certain first-time drug offenses after a period of probation.
89. Geffen & Letze, supra note 87, at 1344 (citing an interview with Minnesota State Senator
Don Betzold who helped draft chapter 609A before it was enacted in 1996).
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the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act (the “MGDPA”).90 To pro-
tect this presumption, the legislature intentionally drafted chapter 609A to
include “somewhat cumbersome” procedures for expungement.91 And even
in the cases where statutory expungement is permissible, the legislature
made it an “extraordinary remedy.”92 A court should only grant expunge-
ment “upon clear and convincing evidence that it would yield a benefit to
the petitioner commensurate with the disadvantages to the public and public
safety of: (1) sealing the record; and (2) burdening the court and public
authorities to issue, enforce, and monitor an expungement order.”93
B. Inherent Judicial Authority
Because of the limited statutory authority, many offenders seek relief
from the courts’ inherent authority to seal their records. The judiciary has
inherent authority to order expungement in two circumstances: (1) when
expungement is necessary to protect a petitioner’s constitutional rights or
(2) when expungement is “necessary to the performance of the judicial
function as contemplated in our state constitution.”94 Under the first cir-
cumstance, a court may invoke its inherent authority in cases where a gov-
ernment agent has abused his power and used the petitioner’s records in a
way that violates the petitioner’s constitutional rights.95
More often, courts are presented with the second situation. Inherent
authority under this concept is based on the separation-of-powers doctrine
and “governs that which is essential to the existence, dignity, and function
of a court because it is a court.”96 Over the past decade, Minnesota appel-
late courts have corroded this doctrine into one that often fails to provide
meaningful relief. Given the lack of clear guidelines, a review of recent
significant decisions is helpful in understanding the evolution of the judici-
ary’s inherent authority to order expungement.
1. State v. Schultz
The Minnesota Court of Appeals in State v. Schultz97 distinguished
between judicial and non-judicial records when it affirmed expungement of
judicial records.98 “[T]he more difficult of the issues” was whether the dis-
trict court had the authority to order expungement of non-judicial records
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. MINN. STAT. § 609A.03 subd. 5 (2012).
93. Id. Although, the standard seems high, it has been noted that there appears to be no
appellate court opinions that have denied expungement under the statute. See Geffen & Letze,
supra note 87, at 1353.
94. State v. S.L.H., 755 N.W.2d 271, 275 (Minn. 2008).
95. State v. T.M.B., 590 N.W.2d 809, 813 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
96. S.L.H., 755 N.W.2d at 275.
97. 676 N.W.2d 337 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
98. Id. at 342.
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held by the executive branch.99 Noting that existing precedent was some-
what inconsistent, the Schultz court proceeded to examine prior case law
and determined that inherent judicial authority was limited to “unique judi-
cial functions, corresponding court records, and agents of the court.”100 Re-
lying on “the important separation-of-powers issues implicated in
expungement questions,” the court of appeals concluded that the district
court exceeded its authority by ordering other branches of government to
seal non-judicial records.101 Despite this limitation, courts could still order
the expungement of significant judicially created records but could not re-
quire other branches to seal their records.
2. State v. V.A.J.
Although Schultz restricted the judiciary’s inherent authority to order
other branches to seal records, its scope was limited, and the availability of
expungement under inherent judicial authority remained unclear. In State v.
V.A.J., the Minnesota Court of Appeals seized the opportunity to clarify and
reassert the judiciary’s inherent authority under certain circumstances. The
court conceded that the district court lacked authority to order expungement
of non-judicial records, i.e. records “created and maintained by the execu-
tive branch,” such as a petitioner’s arrest record and investigative file.102 It
held, however, that the judicial branch retained the authority to order the
executive to seal those records that were created by the judiciary and dis-
seminated to executive branch agencies, including the Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension (“BCA”),103 for custodial purposes. Those records included
documents detailing the offense, the court of conviction, the date of convic-
tion, and sentencing information.104 Thus, when a district court invoked its
inherent authority to order expungement, that order included public records
created in the judicial branch and held by the BCA.105
Concurring in the result of V.A.J., Judge Shumaker wrote separately
and in three brief paragraphs made two crucial, yet seemingly disregarded,
points. First, he noted that to order “the remedy of record expungement but
then to limit the reach of that expungement so that the record remains ac-
cessible to the public is to effectively deny that remedy.”106 Next, Judge
Shumaker pointed out the additional shadow cast over a petitioner who in-
forms an employer that he does not have a criminal record (as he is permit-
99. Id.
100. Id. at 343 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
101. Id. at 344.
102. State v. V.A.J., 744 N.W.2d 674, 677–78 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008).
103. Id. at 678. Petitioners are often most concerned with the BCA expunging records because
records held at the BCA are a common source for employment and housing background checks.
Id. at 675.
104. Id. at 678.
105. Id.
106. Id. (Shumaker, J., concurring).
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ted to do upon a court’s expungement order) only to have that employer
discover otherwise after checking the BCA database. Not only does the
criminal record potentially affect the petitioner’s qualifications for employ-
ment, but also now “the person’s credibility is impugned or destroyed.”107
Judge Shumaker’s concurrence grasped the essence of the inherent author-
ity to grant expungements, yet his reasoning has not been acknowledged,
much less followed, as Minnesota case law has continued towards limiting
this inherent authority.
3. State v. S.L.H.
The Minnesota Supreme Court redefined and limited this inherent au-
thority shortly after V.A.J. was decided in 2008.108 In State v. S.L.H., the
court effectively extinguished a petitioner’s right to seek expungement
under inherent judicial authority absent a constitutional violation.109 In do-
ing so, the court departed from Schultz and V.A.J. and declined to distin-
guish between judicial and non-judicial records. Instead, the court focused
on whether the separation-of-powers doctrine precluded the judiciary from
ordering the executive branch to seal any records, regardless of where the
records were created.
In 2006, S.L.H. sought expungement of criminal records related to a
1992 conviction for fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance.110
She was twenty years old at the time of the conviction, received a stay of
imposition, and successfully completed probation, after which her offense
was deemed a misdemeanor. As a single mother of four children, S.L.H.
requested expungement so she could work as a teacher or a medical assis-
tant to better support her family.111 After finding that the benefit to S.L.H.
of expungement outweighed the disadvantages to the public, the district
court granted her expungement based on its inherent judicial authority but
declined to extend the order to executive agencies.112 S.L.H. appealed, and
the Minnesota Supreme Court granted her petition for review.113
The court cobbled together a two-part test to determine whether or not
the judiciary could exercise inherent authority to expunge criminal records
held outside the judicial branch. A court must first identify the judicial
function at issue and then determine whether “appropriate circumstances”
107. Id. at 677–78.
108. State v. M.L.A., 785 N.W.2d 763, 767 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that the conflicting
holdings of V.A.J. and S.L.H. cannot be reconciled and because the supreme court decided S.L.H.
after the court of appeals decided V.A.J., “S.L.H. supersedes V.A.J.”).
109. State v. S.L.H., 755 N.W.2d 271, 275 (Minn. 2008).
110. Id. at 273.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 274.
113. Id.
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are present so that expungement is necessary to accomplish a core judicial
function.114
In applying the test, the court examined two precedential cases. First,
in State v. C.A., the petitioner requested expungement of records related to
his “arrest, trial and conviction” after his conviction of “consensual sod-
omy” was set aside.115 In identifying the judicial function at issue, the
S.L.H. court explained:
In C.A., the judicial function at issue was reduc[ing] or
eliminat[ing] unfairness to individuals that could arise if court
records, records related to the court process, or records used by
agents in that process were used in a way that undermined the
benefit to the petitioner of having his conviction set aside.116
Because the conviction was no longer valid, expungement “could be viewed
as being closely tied to the core judicial function of granting full relief (and
thus eliminat[ing] unfairness) to the petitioner.”117 The S.L.H. court did not
go on to identify the “appropriate circumstances” to exercise inherent au-
thority, but explained that the “unfairness concern at issue in C.A.—crimi-
nal records negatively impacting the petitioner even after his conviction had
been set aside—is not implicated in the same way because S.L.H. continues
to stand convicted.”118
The S.L.H. court then examined Barlow v. Commissioner of Public
Safety, in which the petitioner’s driver’s license was revoked after he was
arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence.119 Because the peti-
tioner pled guilty to a careless driving charge, his license revocation was
judicially rescinded.120 Thereafter, the petitioner requested that the court
order the Commissioner of Public Safety to remove any records relating to
his license revocation and subsequent reinstatement.121 The district court
did so, but the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, explaining that the peti-
tioner’s only complaint was that the records would increase his car insur-
ance rates.122 And because the petitioner pled guilty to careless driving, the
matter was of record, and “the facts of Barlow did not raise the fairness
concern that was implicated in C.A. where the petitioner’s conviction had
been set aside.”123
Upon analyzing these precedents in S.L.H., the Minnesota Supreme
Court concluded that the “facts of this case are actually closer to those of
114. Id. at 277.
115. 304 N.W.2d 353, 355 (Minn. 1981).
116. S.L.H., 755 N.W.2d at 277.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. 365 N.W.2d 232, 233 (Minn. 1985).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 234.
123. S.L.H., 755 N.W.2d at 277.
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Barlow.”124 The court stated that S.L.H. did “not seem to implicate a core
judicial function or to present the ‘appropriate circumstances’” as discussed
in C.A. to exercise inherent judicial authority.125 It further compared the
case to C.A. and reasoned:
Unlike the petitioner in C.A., S.L.H. does not argue that she is
entitled to expungement because her conviction was set aside.
S.L.H. instead seeks expungement on the ground that it is neces-
sary for her to achieve her employment goals. But helping indi-
viduals achieve employment goals is not essential to the
existence, dignity, and function of a court because it is a court.126
Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s order declining to seal
S.L.H.’s records held outside the judicial branch and effectively precluded a
subsequent finding of the “appropriate circumstances” that would invoke
the court’s inherent expungement authority.
IV. RETHINKING JUDICIAL EXPUNGEMENT AUTHORITY
In revoking the judiciary’s prior inherent authority to expunge records,
the S.L.H. court gave insufficient consideration to the core judicial func-
tions at issue. The court ultimately failed to recognize that despite the dif-
ferent circumstances of C.A. and S.L.H., granting full relief and reducing
unfairness are both judicial functions that are applicable to S.L.H. The Min-
nesota Supreme Court explicitly recognized “the core judicial function of
granting full relief” but then limited that function to cases where a peti-
tioner’s conviction has been set aside.127 As Judge Shumaker explained in
his V.A.J. concurrence, “to offer to eligible persons the remedy of record
expungement but then to limit the reach of that expungement so that the
record remains accessible to the public is to effectively deny that rem-
edy.”128 Thus, a court ordering executive branches to expunge judicial
records after properly determining that such an order is appropriate is a
judicial function and is concomitant with granting full relief.
Moreover, although Minnesota has thus far declined to recognize col-
lateral consequences for sentencing purposes, given their punitive nature,
both the courts and legislature should begin to do so. Collateral sanctions
are undoubtedly punitive because they treat ex-offenders as second-class
citizens and eliminate employment and housing opportunities. While some
collateral sanctions are justifiable, they cannot be justified in the indiscrimi-
nate manner that they are currently imposed. Because they result in a per-
petual “sentence” to punish an individual, this process should be considered
as part of a judicial function. But because collateral sanctions are imposed
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 277–78.
127. Id. at 277.
128. State v. V.A.J., 744 N.W.2d 674, 678 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (Shumaker, J., concurring).
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not only by the government but also by private individuals and institutions,
their imposition is not as straightforward as traditional sentencing under the
criminal justice system. The power to expunge records and order other
agencies to do the same is one way to remedy this conundrum and control
the imposition of sentences extending beyond those sanctioned by the court.
By allowing judges some discretion in their ability to expunge records,
judges can consider how best to accomplish the goals of punishment: pre-
dictability, proportionality, and equity.
Because the judicial function of imposing sentences must be exercised
within the limits prescribed by the legislature,129 judges should utilize
guidelines analogous to the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines in determin-
ing when expungement is appropriate. This would allow a judge to focus on
the individual to ensure that she is only subject to collateral sanctions that
are predictable, proportional, and equitable. Factors to consider might in-
clude the nature of the offense, the ex-offender’s current situation and back-
ground, efforts at rehabilitation, and the hardships encountered from having
a public criminal record. This would more closely align collateral sanctions
with criminal sanctions and more accurately acknowledge the inherently
punitive nature of both. It would force courts and legislatures to recognize
the punitive nature of both. Moreover, by using expungement guidelines,
courts would be able to counteract allegations of unbridled judicial discre-
tion—real or perceived. The guidelines would act to constrain courts such
that judges would only depart from the guidelines in extraordinary circum-
stances. Just as in the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, a judge could de-
part from expungement guidelines only if “there exist identifiable,
substantial, and compelling circumstances to support” a departure.130 Like-
wise, judicial discretion to go beyond the guidelines would be “constrained
by case law and appellate review” and would require the judge to “disclose
in writing or on the record the particular substantial and compelling circum-
stances” justifying the departure.131
The expungement guidelines could also enumerate types of crimes for
which a court would require a much higher demonstration of rehabilitation
to grant an expungement. For example, just as the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines treat sex crimes differently from other crimes, so too would ex-
pungement guidelines. And that is just the point of using guidelines rather
than imposing automatic sanctions on every person who has committed any
crime. By creating a higher burden for certain offenders to obtain an ex-
pungement, the guidelines could better reflect the predictability, proportion-
ality, and equity required of any properly constructed punishment.
129. State v. Olson, 325 N.W.2d 13, 18 (Minn. 1981) (“[T]he imposition of the sentence
within the limits prescribed by the legislature is purely a judicial function.”).
130. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 24, § II(D).
131. Id. at 28–29.
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CONCLUSION
The collateral sanctions of criminal conviction have the potential to
affect an ex-offender forever. If our morals as a society promote forgive-
ness, second chances, and equity, then there must be wider recognition of
the inherent unfairness in such perpetual punishment. Minnesota should ex-
pand its expungement law in a way that recognizes the judicial functions in
enforcing basic principles of criminal punishment in the context of collat-
eral sanctions and that allows the judiciary to offer complete relief.
